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Abstract In this work project, we use the approach considered in Kramer et al. (2012) which 
is based on a Panel Data Threshold model in order to study the different effects that fiscal 
policy has on gross domestic product (GDP) whenever economies face negative or positive 
output gaps. Our sample includes the 15 EU countries in 2000 and uses data from 2000Q1 until 
2016Q2. We find that the value of the output gap that makes the model shift from one regime 
to another is -0.73% and only when the output gap is smaller than that value does the fiscal 
multiplier become significant and GDP and Government Expenses are positively correlated. In 




Europe has suffered considerably from the collateral effects of the financial crisis of 
2008, especially due to the sovereign debt crisis which was a side effect of the 
previously mentioned crisis because of the increase in investor’s risk perception. This 
last crisis affected many European countries, namely Greece, Portugal and Ireland that 
needed bailouts to return to the markets.  
Meanwhile, governments tried to reduce their expenses and increase their 
revenues by reducing services and increasing taxes in those countries. The expected 
effects were, of course, contractionary but countries felt that the consolidation of 
public accounts were more important than making GDP return to its normal level in 
the short run and giving those countries more favorable conditions in the future to 
achieve their potential GDP.  
This line of thought was instigated by the high interest rates that those countries 
had to pay to have access to funds in the markets because investors felt that these 
countries would not be able to repay their debt at those levels. So, states tried to show 
that they were doing an enormous effort to make things right.  
Nevertheless, the effects of the so called austerity measures were not as 
anticipated and the contractionary effects were even larger than excepted. For 
instance, Greece drowned into a spiral of impoverishment and its GDP lost more than 
100 billion dollars in solely five years, which represents a drop of more than 30% while 
its public debt level to GDP never stopped increasing. Portugal suffered massively, too, 
but the Portuguese government was more successful in implementing those measures 
and GDP is growing at modest rates since 2013.  
The purpose of this study is to show that the effects were not as planned because 
multipliers are not fixed and change when the economic conditions change. What we 
will try to prove is that it is wrong to use multipliers obtained in regular periods when 
you are facing an atypical event such as a crisis.  
To do so, we will use the 15 countries that composed the European Union (EU) 
from 2000 until 2016 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom), and we will set up a Panel data regression threshold model, in order to 
show that an increase in government expenditures has different impacts on GDP 
growth depending on whether we are in a positive or negative output gap period.  
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. Section 3 
introduces the model we will use. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents our 
empirical results. Section 6 provides some robustness tests, and Section 7 puts forward 
the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
As a consequence of the crisis and the effects of policies with underestimated 
results the subject of varying fiscal multipliers has started to arise and economists 
restarted to see fiscal policy as a matter of study. 
 Even so, there are not many studies that look at fiscal multipliers in the way 
that we are proposing in this work project as most of them use structural VAR 
methodologies or just a narrative approach.  
 Structural VAR studies use recursive identification (Galí et al., 2007) or 
extremely complex structures (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). The first approach obtains 
an instant multiplier of 0.8 and two years after a response of 1.8, whereas, the second 
finds a peak spending multiplier between 0.9 and 2 depending on some assumptions 
that the authors made.  
 In the narrative approach, authors look at newspapers or government reports 
in order to get external information that may help them identify exogenous fiscal 
shocks. Romer and Romer (2010) and Ramey (2011b) were some of the authors that 
used this approach. Usually they find multipliers from 0.6 to 1.2 depending on the 
sample and the underlying assumptions made. 
 However, since the Great Recession and the Sovereign Debt Crisis, economists 
started to argue that fiscal multipliers may behave in a non-linear way depending on 
the state of the economy. Almunia et al. (2010) and DeLong and Summers (2012) 
showed that during the early 1930s (Great Depression) fiscal multipliers were larger 
and Corsetti et al. (2012) used dummy variables to show that fiscal multipliers increase 
during financial crisis.  
 To study this, we can use dummy variables, as Corsetti et al. have done, but we 
think that using a threshold and allowing the model decide when the economy is in 
one state or the other could eventually be more reliable.  
 Some economists thought in the same way and used a method similar to ours 
relating the regimes to GDP growth and the Output Gap (see e.g. Baum et al., 2012b; 
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Bachmann and Sims, 2012; Candelon and Lieb, 2013, Nunes and Poirier, 2014). Other 
authors on the other hand used other variables in other to capture these states (see 
e.g. Afonso et al., 2011; Baum et al., 2012a; and Ferraresi et al., 2014). 
 Nonetheless, our work is somehow different because it looks at the global EU15 
and uses a panel data threshold model to reinforce that idea. This type of models was 
first introduced by Hansen (1999, 2000) and to the best of our knowledge there has 
been no application of this method to this particular subject. Chang et al. (2009) 
applied it to the relationship between tourism specialization and economic 
development and Kremer et al. (2012) used it to analyze the connection between 
inflation and growth.  
 Our goal is to show that fiscal multipliers change conditionally on the output 
gap, but using different samples of countries during several quarters. Our focus will be 
the fifteen countries that were part of the European Union in the early 2000s.  
3. The Model 
 The model we used is an extension of the approach introduced by Hansen 
(1999) which was developed by Kremer, Bick and Nautz (2012). Since we used their 
model, we will explain it in an extremely similar way as they did. 
This model allows the original setup to have endogenous regressors. Hence, we 
will use GDP growth as our dependent variable and Investment growth as our 
endogenous regressor, due to the Accelerator Theory that shows that investment 
variations are highly correlated with variations in the output.  
 The model of interest can be written as: 
             (      )        (     )      , 
where i = 1,…, 15 represents the first 15 countries joining the European Union by 
alphabetical order and t=1,…, 62 is the time index.    is the country-specific fixed 
effect. The error term is i.i.d. with mean 0 and variance σ2. I(.) is the function that 
indicates the regime, and which is defined by the threshold variable,     corresponds 
to the output gap, and   is the threshold level.     is a vector of explanatory variables 




3.1. Fixed-effects elimination 
 We start the estimation process by removing the fixed effects,   , through a 
fixed-effects transformation. To do so, we have to eliminate the country-specific fixed 
effects without going against the distributional assumptions underlying Hansen (1999) 
and Caner and Hansen (2004).  
 In this dynamic model, the transformation proposed by Hansen (1999) leads to 
inconsistency because the lagged variable is always correlated with the transformed 
individual errors. Hence, to overcome this problem, Kremer et al. (2012) used the 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
to eliminate the fixed effects. This transformation is especially virtuous because it 
avoids serial correlation of the transformed error terms.  
 This transformation is not a simple first difference or the subtraction of the 
mean from each observation. In this process the average of all future available 
observations of a variable is considered.  
 The transformation is given by: 
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where T is the total number of observations, (T=62 in our case).  
 Looking at the variance of the error terms, we observe that the error terms are 
uncorrelated: 
   (  )   
       (  
 )        . 
3.2. Estimation 
 Following Caner and Hansen (2004), we then estimate a reduced form 
regression for the endogenous variables as a function of the instruments and replace 
them by their predicted values. In the second step, the main equation presented 
before is estimated by least squares for a specific threshold value  . 
  The threshold value   is estimated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals. 
The second step is repeated for a strict subset of the support of the threshold variable 
  and   is fixed as the one that has the smallest sum of squared residuals. Standard 




As previously indicated, this paper focuses on the 15 countries that constituted 
the EU from 1995 until 2004, they are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
The variables used are GDP, Government Expenditures, Inflation and Output 
Gap. GDP and government expenditures were obtained from Eurostat, GDP at market 
prices and final consumption expenditure of general government were the items 
chosen, both at current prices and seasonally and calendar adjusted. Inflation was 
obtained from the OECD and Output Gap was obtained from the IMF for some 
countries and from the OECD for others.  
To avoid scale problems, GDP and Government Expenditures were used in per 
capita values. To do so, we looked for Total Population in Eurostat and computed the 
ratio.  
All data is quarterly and refers to the period between 2000Q1 and 2016Q2. The 
starting point was chosen because of data limitations for some countries which did not 
report quarterly data until the beginning of the 2000s.  
To compute inflation and output gap, we used a GDP weighted average. During 
that time, the mean quarterly GDP of those 15 countries was 2859 billion euros, the 
mean quarterly inflation was 0.43% and the economies spent more time with a 
negative output gap than with a positive one, as 516 observations reveal an output gap 
below zero.  
5. Empirical Results 
 To get the answers that we are looking for, we apply the panel threshold model 
to our data in order to see if fiscal policy has different effects on GDP.  
 As mentioned before, our model consists of GDP as the dependent variable and 
Government Expenses, Investment, Private Consumption, Real Exchange Rate, 
Population, Prices and Lagged GDP as explanatory ones. All these variables are 




 Investment growth is considered as endogenous due to the accelerator effect 
proposed by Jorgenson (1963) which says that variations in investment are highly 
correlated with variations in GDP growth. 
 As instruments, we use lags of the endogenous variable: investment growth. In 
our application we just used one lag. 
5.1. Threshold selection 
 The first step to get our results is to endogenously select the threshold value 
that shifts our model from one regime to another. We decided to use just one 














Figure 1 - Threshold selection 
 As can be observed from figure 1, our model provides the result that the value 
of the output gap that makes the economy shift from one regime to another is -
0.7307%. 
 The 95% confidence interval is between -1.4303% and 0.1527%. This shows that 
when the output gap gets slightly negative or zero, the economy changes its behavior 
towards government expenses. 
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5.2. Slopes and Standard Errors 
 For the variables which do not depend on the regimes we observe that all 
variables, with the exception of Inflation and Real Exchange Rate change, are 
significant. 1 
Variables Estimates Standard Errors 95% Confidence Interval 
   Investment 0.2048* 0.0522 0.1011 – 0.3061 
   GDPt-1 0.2983* 0.0881 0.1310 – 0.4768 
   Consumption 0.4005* 0.0557 0.2815 – 0.5011 
Inflation -0.0564 0.0766 -0.1933 – 0.1120 
   Real Ex. Rate -0.0194 0.0269 -0.0784 – 0.0300 
   Population -0.4350** 0.1878 -0.8066 – -0.0638 
Table 1 - Regime Independent Variable 
 Regarding Government Expenses, we found that its behavior is only significant 
when the output gap is negative. This reinforces the idea that governments must 
intervene when the economy is facing negative output gaps and that interventions 
when the economy is overheated are pointless.  
   Government Expenses Estimates Standard Errors 95% Confidence Interval 
Output Gap < -0.7307% 0.1021* 0.0342 0.0429 – 0.1778 
Output Gap > -0.7307% 0.0357 0.0331 -0.0067 – 0.1253 
Table 2 - Regime Dependent Variable 
 This model also allows for a constant term whenever the threshold variable is 
below the threshold value, so, whenever we are facing an output gap below -0.007307, 
the economy tends to grow, but at low levels. 
Constant Term Estimate Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Output Gap < -0.7307% 0.0011* 0.0005 0.0005 – 0.0026 
Table 3 – Regime Specific Constant Term 
 These results confirm that fiscal policy is an important tool whenever 
economies are in recession.  
 In order to confirm our findings, we also performed some robustness tests by 
changing the countries selected and the time frame that we are analyzing.  
6. Robustness Tests 
 In order to see if our conclusions hold under different circumstances, we 
decided to perform some robustness checks by changing the data frame.   
                                                          
*/**/*** indicate significance at the 1/5/10% level 
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 We will analyze the results of running the model without the “PIGS” countries 
and the results of a model just with “PIGS” countries. Furthermore, we will also redo 
the analysis by discarding the period after 2009 as well as looking only at the period 
after 2009. 
 When trying to perform the model with GDP growth or lagged GDP growth as 
threshold variable, the results showed that the threshold value is fixed for high levels 
of growth, which is a problem because one regime ends up with extremely few 
observations. 
6.1. Without “PIGS” 
During the years that we are considering, four countries received external aid. 
Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain got through the crisis with even more difficulties 
than the rest of the EU countries. In order to see if their removal from our sample 
changes our conclusions significantly, we decided to redo the entire model with just 11 
countries, i.e., without the so-called “PIGS”.  
Threshold Value 95% Confidence Interval 
-0.7307% -1.1922% – -0.3751% 
Table 4 - Threshold Value Without PIGS 
Variables Estimates Standard Errors 
   Investment 0.3055* 0.0530 
   GDPt-1 0.1546** 0.0633 
   Consumption 0.4183* 0.0738 
Inflation -0.0862 0.0778 
   Real Ex. Rate 0.0144 0.0243 
   Population -0.3035 0.2848 
Table 5 - Regime Independent Variables Without PIGS 
   Government Expenses Estimates Standard Errors 
Output Gap < -0.7307% 0.1520* 0.0506 
Output Gap > -0.7307% 0.0358** 0.0499 
Table 6 - Regime Dependent Variable Without PIGS 
Constant Term Estimate Standard Error 
Output Gap < -0.7307% 0.0006** 0.0005 
Table 7 - Regime Specific Constant Term Without PIGS 
 These results confirm our previous results and reinforce them, since we can see 
that in the 11 countries that did not face external aid during the crisis, fiscal policy has 
an even greater weight during the recession periods.  
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 However, even though it is true that these results reinforce our previous 
findings, it means that in PIGS, things are not so well behaved as in the other countries.  
6.2. “PIGS” 
 In this restricted sample, the results go against our previous findings. However, 
the fact that only Investment, Real Exchange Rate and Government Expenses in 
periods in which the output gap is above the threshold value are significant, reinforces 
the idea that these countries should be seen as outliers.  
Threshold Value 95% Confidence Interval 
-3.0733% -8.6247% – -2.9149% 
Table 8 - Threshold Value for PIGS 
Variables Estimates Standard Errors 
   Investment 0.2359** 0.1030 
   GDPt-1 0.3246*** 0.1817 
   Consumption 0.1480 0.1300 
Inflation 0.1505 0.2007 
   Real Ex. Rate -0.2415** 0.0973 
   Population -0.9096** 0.4007 
Table 9 - Regime Independent Variables for PIGS 
   Government Expenses Estimates Standard Errors 
Output Gap < -3.0733% 0.0055 0.0559 
Output Gap > -3.0733% 0.0914** 0.0478 
Table 10 - Regime Dependent Variable for PIGS 
Constant Term Estimate Standard Error 
Output Gap < -3.0733% -0.0047** 0.0020 
Table 11 - Regime Specific Constant Term for PIGS 
 Even though it seems that the results go against the previous ones, we have to 
look carefully at this output. Firstly, we can see that the standard errors increased in 
every variable which shows that these countries went through agitated moments 
which increased the uncertainty of the parameters a lot.  
 Also, this model presents a very low threshold value that is only observable 
after the sovereign debt crisis in these four countries, and, so, it is important to 
understand that one regime is purely showing us results from the crisis whereas the 
other is just allowing us to understand what happened before it.  
 Furthermore, we cannot forget that economies have a tendency to go to 
equilibrium and that equilibrium is when the output gap is close to zero, so, although 
these countries applied some contractionary measures, the economy had pressure to 
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go to equilibrium, i.e., to grow. This explains why when governments were diminishing 
their expenses, GDP did not fall as much as was expected.  
 In sum, this model in this subsamble demonstrates a lot of uncertainty 
measured by the standard errors, has a low threshold value and the pressure of the 
economy to go to equilibrium is quite high and contractionary measures have no great 
contractionary effects.  
6.3. No Crisis  
 The crisis that began in 2009 showed another side of the economy. A side that 
no one had ever seen before and that could only be related to the Great Depression of 
1929 even though the world was completely different back then. 
 So, it is legitimate to think that the years that followed 2008 introduced a great 
change in the way that we now perceive crises. Also, we can think that the economic 
world changed its behavior and it is now acting in a different way. 
 To prove this, we decided to run the model without any data from 2009 and 
onwards. In this period, negative growth rates were extremely rare with just 5.2% of 
the observations showing this phenomenon, whereas in the period after 2009 we can 
see a terrifying value of 27.6% of GDP shrinking.  
 To understand what changed, we decided to redo the model. 
Threshold Value 95% Confidence Interval 
1.0126% 0.8591% – 4.0041% 
Table 12 - Threshold Value Before 2009 
Variables Estimates Standard Errors 
   Investment 0.3399* 0.0545 
   GDPt-1 0.0637***   0.0975 
   Consumption 0.3530* 0.0709 
Inflation -0.0810 0.1478 
   Real Ex. Rate 0.0666 0.0265 
   Population 0.7173 0.5671 
Table 13 - Regime Independent Variables Before 2009 
   Government Expenses Estimates Standard Errors 
Output Gap < 1.0126% 0.0119* 0.0612 
Output Gap > 1.0126% 0.1908* 0.0427 




Constant Term Estimate Standard Error 
Output Gap < 1.0126% 0.0011* 0.0008 
Table 15 - Regime Specific Constant Term Before 2009 
 Those last years changed a lot the behavior of the economy as this results show 
exactly the opposite tendency regarding government expenses before the crisis.  
Nonetheless, we must understand that only in 18 observations do we see 
contractionary measures (understanding contractionary measures as reductions of 
government expenses), which makes us look almost exclusively to how GDP reacted to 
expansionary measures during the so-called Great Moderation, this creates sort of a 
puzzle because it is not easy to understand why economies tended to deviate from 
equilibrium in a positive way.  
However, this can be interpreted as one of the reasons why the crisis was so 
hard to overtake. Constantly overheated economies for a long time generate bubble 
effects way more easily and it is undeniable that during the period that we are 
considering, we had several markets, especially the real estate market, living in an 
economic bubble (Lewis, 2010). 
6.4. Just Crisis 
 If it is interesting to look at what happened before the crisis, it is also 
interesting to look at what happened afterwards.  
 In this period, GDP decreased in several countries in several moments and 
economies were constantly facing negative output gaps. It is a period where 
economists were using trial and error in an attempt to surpass the problem because 
this was an all-new phenomenon.  
 In this period we can see increases and decreases of all variables that we use in 
our model and it has a great weight on the way that our main results are presented 
because these periods correspond to almost half of the whole sample. 
Threshold Value 95% Confidence Interval 
-0.9041% -6.6190% – -0.3946% 
Table 16 - Threshold Value After 2009 
Variables Estimates Standard Errors 
   Investment 0.1714 0.1132 
   GDPt-1 0.3320** 0.1421 
   Consumption 0.4248* 0.1137 
Inflation 0.0346 0.1075 
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   Real Ex. Rate -0.0675 0.0472 
   Population -0.1645 0.1787 
Table 17 - Regime Independent Variables After 2009 
   Government Expenses Estimates Standard Errors 
Output Gap < -0.9041% 0.1314* 0.0446 
Output Gap > -0.9041% -0.0035 0.0587 
Table 18 - Regime Dependent Variable After 2009 
Constant Term Estimate Standard Error 
Output Gap < -0.9041% 0.0017*** 0.0008 
Table 19 - Regime Specific Constant Term After 2009 
 In this period, we see that the economy is mainly driven by changes in private 
consumption and that fiscal policy is just significant when the output gap is below the 
threshold level, reinforcing the conclusions of the main model with the whole sample.  
 However, during this period, economies passed three quarters of the whole 
time below the threshold value. 
7. Conclusion 
 This work project tried to understand whether fiscal policy has different effects 
in moments of positive or negative output gap. To do so, we used a panel data 
threshold model allowing for endogenous regressors proposed by Kramer et al. (2012). 
The objective was to study if the fiscal multiplier varies in a non-linear way. 
That non-linearity was provided by the state of the economy, depending on whether 
we were facing a positive or a negative output gap. Our purpose was to understand 
what governments can do when facing a recession period.  
Considering the whole sample, we found what other studies often unveil: 
namely that fiscal policy is stronger when potential GDP is higher than actual GDP and, 
in our case, only in this scenario is fiscal policy significant to variations in GDP.  
Our results suggest a threshold value of -0.7307% for the output gap, when the 
economy shifted from one regime to another, dividing the sample into two regimes. In 
the negative regime (calling negative regime the one where the output gap was below 
the threshold value), the fiscal multiplier was 0.102, which means that whenever 
governments raise their expenses in 1 p.p., ceteris paribus, GDP grwoth increased by 
0.102 p.p., whereas, in the positive regime, the fiscal multiplier found was 0.036, 
however it was not statistically significant.  
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Nevertheless, since we studied 15 EU countries in the period between 2000 and 
2016, one could easily imagine that this sample is quite troubled because of the crisis. 
So we performed two kinds of robustness checks: one with and another without the 
“PIGS” countries and one with the years after and another with the years before 2009.  
In the first case, we found that without the “PIGS”, our model still behaves in 
the same way, the threshold value remains the same and the fiscal multiplier even gets 
larger in the negative regime. However, when studying just the PIGS, we get a smaller 
threshold value (-3.07%) and find that when the output gap is below the threshold, the 
fiscal multiplier is not significant. One possible explanation for this is that these 
countries faced periods of austerity while their GDP was already significantly below its 
potential.  
In the second case, removing the years after 2009, the threshold value 
becomes 1.01% and government expenses are significant and positive when the 
output gap is larger than that value, which is contrary to the previous findings. An 
explanation for this is that this period was marked by overheated economies and 
expansionary measures, which created a bubble effect that distorted the results. When 
looking at the sample from 2009 onwards, we find that our conclusions hold. In this 
case, the threshold value is -0.90% and fiscal policy is only significant when the output 
gap is below that value.  
Our analysis would benefit from a larger sample. Unfortunately, many countries 
did not collect quarterly data before 2000. One interesting development for future 
work is the estimation of a panel data threshold Vector Autoregressive Model 
combining all the literature that is being developed in the Threshold Vector 
Autoregressive Models with the work of Hansen (1999, 2000) in the context of panel 
data threshold models.  
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9.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 All statistics are based in quarterly changes.  
Output Gap MEAN MAX MIN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
Austria -0.12% 3.75% -3.67% -0.36% 2.00% 
Belgium -0.02% 2.94% -2.15% -0.14% 1.30% 
Denmark -0.04% 4.52% -3.61% -0.75% 2.38% 
Finland -0.42% 6.02% -4.88% -0.45% 2.83% 
France -0.05% 2.89% -3.00% -0.03% 1.63% 
Germany -0.34% 3.01% -4.79% -0.09% 1.68% 
Greece -1.54% 9.77% -14.48% 0.17% 7.89% 
Ireland 1.56% 10.37% -8.62% 4.27% 6.94% 
Italy -0.94% 2.89% -4.98% 0.13% 2.71% 
Luxembourg -0.13% 6.01% -4.12% -0.23% 2.09% 
Netherlands -0.40% 3.99% -3.53% -0.92% 2.24% 
Portugal -1.62% 4.45% -8.07% -0.43% 3.63% 
Spain -0.52% 5.58% -7.99% 1.93% 4.28% 
Sweden -0.30% 4.78% -6.24% -0.68% 2.51% 
United Kingdom -0.27% 4.21% -4.56% 0.14% 2.32% 
Table 20 - Output Gap Descriptive Statistics 
GDP Growth MEAN MAX MIN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
Austria 0.78% 1.63% -0.84% 0.76% 0.48% 
Belgium 0.77% 1.53% -0.78% 0.78% 0.47% 
Denmark 0.66% 1.85% -1.51% 0.70% 0.65% 
Finland 0.72% 2.16% -1.90% 0.79% 0.82% 
France 0.64% 1.28% -0.87% 0.74% 0.47% 
Germany 0.61% 1.59% -1.42% 0.70% 0.57% 
Greece 0.34% 2.48% -2.37% 0.33% 1.55% 
Ireland 1.49% 8.63% -2.91% 1.52% 2.26% 
Italy 0.47% 1.50% -1.34% 0.68% 0.59% 
Luxembourg 1.31% 3.48% -1.59% 1.38% 1.06% 
Netherlands 0.69% 1.99% -0.99% 0.73% 0.62% 
Portugal 0.57% 1.65% -1.30% 0.79% 0.76% 
Spain 0.87% 2.08% -0.99% 1.03% 1.02% 
Sweden 0.83% 5.27% -4.39% 0.91% 1.78% 
United Kingdom 0.63% 3.90% -5.42% 0.96% 1.98% 




Government Expenses Growth MEAN MAX MIN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
Austria 0.87% 2.09% -0.54% 0.82% 0.52% 
Belgium 1.01% 2.19% 0.27% 0.94% 0.45% 
Denmark 0.82% 1.98% -0.41% 0.89% 0.56% 
Finland 1.05% 2.14% -0.09% 1.11% 0.53% 
France 0.76% 1.57% 0.26% 0.77% 0.31% 
Germany 0.68% 1.57% -0.34% 0.69% 0.40% 
Greece 0.51% 3.30% -4.25% 1.52% 2.10% 
Ireland 1.22% 4.40% -2.82% 1.18% 1.72% 
Italy 0.58% 2.22% -0.78% 0.30% 0.89% 
Luxembourg 1.60% 3.00% -0.20% 1.69% 0.71% 
Netherlands 1.04% 2.78% -0.39% 0.83% 0.89% 
Portugal 0.51% 2.32% -3.54% 0.71% 1.29% 
Spain 1.10% 2.53% -3.26% 1.61% 1.24% 
Sweden 0.92% 4.18% -2.74% 1.00% 1.43% 
United Kingdom 0.87% 3.69% -3.19% 1.37% 1.64% 
Table 22 – Government Expenses Growth Descriptive Statistics 
Investment Growth MEAN MAX MIN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
Austria 0.60% 2.32% -2.18% 0.72% 0.99% 
Belgium 0.83% 3.29% -2.26% 0.96% 1.37% 
Denmark 0.53% 4.85% -5.58% 0.65% 1.95% 
Finland 0.56% 4.38% -4.95% 0.82% 1.67% 
France 0.67% 2.20% -2.79% 0.85% 1.08% 
Germany 0.40% 3.28% -2.69% 0.41% 1.36% 
Greece -0.56% 7.44% -9.08% -0.22% 3.96% 
Ireland 1.78% 10.50% -8.36% 2.12% 4.42% 
Italy 0.16% 2.42% -3.09% 0.60% 1.31% 
Luxembourg 1.45% 7.03% -6.13% 1.29% 2.70% 
Netherlands 0.49% 3.83% -3.25% 0.81% 1.56% 
Portugal -0.41% 2.54% -5.52% 0.13% 1.97% 
Spain 0.45% 3.30% -6.44% 1.43% 2.46% 
Sweden 1.00% 5.92% -6.05% 1.22% 2.25% 
United Kingdom 0.57% 4.87% -7.57% 0.98% 2.77% 




Consumption Growth MEAN MAX MIN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
Austria 0.73% 1.53% 0.05% 0.68% 0.36% 
Belgium 0.71% 1.48% -0.45% 0.63% 0.42% 
Denmark 0.72% 2.00% -1.09% 0.72% 0.57% 
Finland 0.95% 1.90% -0.57% 1.03% 0.53% 
France 0.65% 1.40% -0.54% 0.73% 0.44% 
Germany 0.50% 1.06% -0.37% 0.52% 0.27% 
Greece 0.41% 2.58% -2.65% 0.83% 1.53% 
Ireland 0.92% 2.92% -3.38% 1.29% 1.43% 
Italy 0.48% 1.32% -0.67% 0.63% 0.50% 
Luxembourg 0.92% 2.53% -0.14% 0.96% 0.53% 
Netherlands 0.50% 1.48% -1.14% 0.49% 0.52% 
Portugal 0.62% 1.75% -1.44% 0.93% 0.86% 
Spain 0.81% 2.04% -1.63% 0.81% 0.96% 
Sweden 0.75% 4.40% -3.36% 0.83% 1.56% 
United Kingdom 0.57% 3.90% -5.05% 0.82% 1.93% 
Table 24 – Private Consumption Growth Descriptive Statistics 
Inflation MEAN MAX MIN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
Austria 0.48% 0.92% 0.01% 0.45% 0.21% 
Belgium 0.48% 1.37% -0.31% 0.47% 0.31% 
Denmark 0.44% 1.03% 0.03% 0.49% 0.22% 
Finland 0.38% 1.12% -0.26% 0.35% 0.32% 
France 0.36% 0.82% -0.11% 0.42% 0.21% 
Germany 0.36% 0.76% -0.06% 0.38% 0.19% 
Greece 0.54% 1.37% -0.59% 0.72% 0.52% 
Ireland 0.47% 1.33% -1.55% 0.56% 0.65% 
Italy 0.46% 0.98% -0.10% 0.53% 0.26% 
Luxembourg 0.50% 1.06% -0.03% 0.54% 0.25% 
Netherlands 0.47% 1.08% 0.00% 0.44% 0.25% 
Portugal 0.51% 1.18% -0.38% 0.61% 0.38% 
Spain 0.55% 1.21% -0.26% 0.65% 0.40% 
Sweden 0.30% 1.06% -0.35% 0.25% 0.31% 
United Kingdom 0.52% 1.17% -0.01% 0.50% 0.28% 




Real Ex. Rate Perc. Change MEAN MAX MIN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
Austria 0.05% 1.13% -1.14% 0.10% 0.52% 
Belgium 0.11% 1.26% -1.49% 0.12% 0.58% 
Denmark 0.07% 1.74% -1.73% 0.08% 0.72% 
Finland 0.06% 1.87% -2.16% 0.11% 0.86% 
France 0.02% 1.87% -1.87% 0.11% 0.76% 
Germany -0.02% 1.64% -1.92% 0.05% 0.77% 
Greece 0.10% 2.06% -2.15% 0.18% 0.76% 
Ireland 0.12% 2.89% -2.62% 0.40% 1.18% 
Italy 0.11% 2.06% -1.79% 0.18% 0.79% 
Luxembourg 0.17% 1.37% -1.03% 0.23% 0.45% 
Netherlands 0.10% 1.44% -1.48% 0.06% 0.66% 
Portugal 0.11% 1.53% -1.18% 0.13% 0.58% 
Spain 0.17% 1.89% -1.72% 0.28% 0.67% 
Sweden -0.08% 2.88% -3.85% 0.08% 1.48% 
United Kingdom -0.16% 2.12% -5.36% -0.04% 1.47% 
Table 26 – Real Exchange Rate Percentage Change Descriptive Statistics 
Population Growth MEAN MAX MIN MEDIAN STD. DEV. 
Austria 0.12% 0.36% 0.04% 0.11% 0.06% 
Belgium 0.15% 0.23% 0.01% 0.16% 0.05% 
Denmark 0.10% 0.21% 0.01% 0.09% 0.03% 
Finland 0.09% 0.12% 0.01% 0.10% 0.03% 
France 0.14% 0.20% -0.04% 0.14% 0.04% 
Germany -0.01% 0.30% -0.45% -0.01% 0.12% 
Greece -0.01% 0.09% -0.29% 0.04% 0.11% 
Ireland 0.32% 0.83% -0.03% 0.38% 0.23% 
Italy 0.10% 0.46% -0.53% 0.12% 0.13% 
Luxembourg 0.43% 0.70% 0.00% 0.42% 0.14% 
Netherlands 0.10% 0.19% 0.00% 0.10% 0.04% 
Portugal 0.02% 0.28% -0.27% 0.03% 0.12% 
Spain 0.23% 0.47% -0.16% 0.33% 0.20% 
Sweden 0.16% 0.31% 0.03% 0.18% 0.07% 
United Kingdom 0.16% 0.38% 0.01% 0.16% 0.07% 
Table 27 – Population Growth Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
